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Abstract: By constructing a provability predicate with Diophantine form in Peano Arithmetic (PA) 
and based on the abstract form of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, it is proved that, if PA 
is consistent, then for every axiom and every theorem of PA, we can construct a corresponding 
undecidable proposition with Diophantine form. Finally, we present a method that transforms 
seeking a proof of a mathematical (set theoretical, number theoretical, algebraic, geometrical, 
topological, etc) proposition into solving a Diophantine equation. 
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Since the Matijasevič-Robinson-Davis-Putnam (MRDP) theorem has been established in the 
year 1970, some undecidable propositions with Diophantine form in First-order Peano Arithmetic 
(PA) have been studied
[1, 2]
. For example, T. Franzén
[3]
 explains how the MRDP theorem can be 
used to obtain a proof to Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. Another consequence of the 
MRDP theorem mentioned in Ref.[3], which depends on the fact that PA (in fact, EA (Elementary 
Arithmetic)
[4]
) proves the MRDP theorem, is that, given any Π
0
1- sentence K, we can construct a 
corresponding Diophantine equation D (x1,…, xn)=0 such that it is provable in PA that K is true if 
and only if the equation has no solution. According to this consequence, if a Π
0
1- sentence is 
undecidable, then we can construct an undecidable proposition with Diophantine form. 
In this paper, by constructing a provability predicate with Diophantine form in PA and based 
on the abstract form of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, it is proved that, for every axiom 
and every theorem of PA, we can construct a corresponding Diophantine equation such that if PA 
is consistent, then the Diophantine equation has no solution, but this fact is not provable within PA. 
Hence, every axiom and every theorem of PA can draw forth an undecidable proposition.  
The method obtaining the above result is quite simple and don’t need more knowledge about 
PA. For example, we don’t need the conclusion “PA proves the MRDP theorem”. This method 
may also be used to those arithmetic theories that do not prove the totality of exponentiation. 
Lemma 1. (1) Introducing a set PrfF for a formula F of PA: 
PrfF := {a∈PrfF | a is a Gödel code of a proof of the formula F of PA}, 
the set PrfF  is recursive. 
(2) There is a Diophantine equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0, which is called the proof equation 
of a formula F of PA, such that a∈PrfF if and only if DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has solution x0=a and 
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{xw}={xw0}, where #F reads the Gödel code of the formula F, {xw} is the abbreviation for w 
variables x1, x2, …, xw. For the proof equation we have 
(2.1) DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has solution if and only if PA┣ F; 
(2.2) If PA┣ F, then if PA is consistent, then DPE(#(┑F), x0, {xw})=0 has not solution, 
where #(┑F) reads the Gödel code of the formula ┑F. 
(3) There is a formula dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}) of PA as the representation of DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 
such that, if DPE(#F, b0, {bw})=0, then PA┣ dPE((#F)′, b0′, {bw′}); If DPE(#F, b0, {bw})≠0, then 
PA┣ ┑dPE((#F)′, b0′, {bw′}). In the formula dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}), (#F)′ is the abbreviation for 
term 0′′
…
′ (There are #F successors “′”), b0′ and {bw′} as well. 
(4) Let B(x) be the formula ∃(x0, {xw}) dPE(x, x0, {xw}). For which we have 
(4.1) If DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has solution, then PA┣ B((#F)′);  
(4.2) If PA┣ B((#F)′), then if PA is ω-consistent, then DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has solution. 
(5) Any formula F of PA can cause a sequence of proof equations and B-formulas. Concretely, 
from the formula F and the corresponding DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 and B((#F)′), let W1 be the B((#F)′); 
For the formula W1 of PA we have the corresponding DPE(#W1, x10, {xw1})=0 and B((#W1)′), let W2 
be the B((#W1)′); For the formula W2 of PA we have the corresponding DPE(#W2, x20, {xw2})=0 and 
B((#W2)′), let W3 be the B((#W2)′); …. The basic characteristic of such sequence of  
DPE(#Wt, xt0, {xwt})=0 and B((#Wt)′)   (t = 0, 1, 2, …; Wt+1:= B((#Wt)′), W0:=F) 
is that if PA is ω-consistent, then if one equation DPE(#Wu, xu0, {xwu})=0 in the sequence has 
solution, then all the rest equations DPE(#Wt, xt0, {xwt})=0 have solutions and PA┣ B((#Wt)′) for 
all t = 0, 1, 2, …. 
The proof of Lemma 1 is quite simple, here we only write out that of Lemma 1(4.1) and (4.2) 
as two examples. 
Proof. (4.1): Assuming a group of solution of DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 are x0=a and {xw}={aw}, 
from Lemma 1(3) we have PA┣ dPE((#F)', a', {aw'}), and then PA┣ ∃(x0, {xw}) dPE((#F)', x0, 
{xw}), namely, PA┣ B((#F)′). 
(4.2): If PA┣ B((#F)′), namely, PA┣ ┑ ∀ (x0, {xw})┑dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}). Suppose 
DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has no solution, from Lemma 1(3), for all (b0′, {bw′}) we have PA┣ ┑
dPE((#F)′, b0′, {bw′}). Hence, all formulas ┑dPE((#F)′, b0′, {bw′}) for all (b0′, {bw′}) and  ┑∀ (x0, 
{xw}) ┑dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}) are provable in PA, PA is thus ω-inconsistency. 
Remark 1. (1) If we apply the MRDP theorem to the set PrfF introduced in Lemma 1(1), then 
what we obtain directly is a Diophantine equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 with the parameter a such 
that a∈PrfF if and only if DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 has solution {xw}={xw0}. This characteristic of the 
equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 allows us to replace a with an unknown x0 and, thus, obtain the 
corresponding proof equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0. 
(2) Changing the parameter a in the equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 into an unknown x0 leads to 
that great change take place in characteristics of the equation. Whether the equation DPE(#F, a, 
{xw})=0 has solution for a given a is decidable, since whether a given natural number is a Gödel 
code of a proof of a given formula of PA is decidable. Once we know a given a is (not) a Gödel 
code of a proof of a given formula F, at the same time we also know that DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 has 
(not) solution. However, for the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 we have not similar deciding 
method. 
Of course, maybe we have different method to decide whether the equation DPE(#F, x0, 
{xw})=0 has solution. For example, if we know that F is (not) a theorem of PA, then at the same 
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time we also know that DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has (not) solution. 
(3) If we rewrite the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 to the form DPEL(#F, x0, {xw})=DPER(#F, x0, 
{xw}), where both DPEL(#F, x0, {xw}) and DPER(#F, x0, {xw}) are polynomials with natural number 
coefficients, then from the form DPEL(#F, x0, {xw})=DPER(#F, x0, {xw}) we can obtain the 
corresponding representation dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}) immediately.  
For obtaining dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}) from DPEL(#F, x0, {xw})=DPER(#F, x0, {xw}), what we need 
is only the representability of recursive functions (in fact, that of polynomial functions), but not 
the conclusion “PA proves the MRDP theorem”. 
(4) In the proof of Lemma 1(4.2), what we need is in fact the n-fold form of ω-consistency, 
so called “ω
n
-consistency
[2]
”, since dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}) is multivariate but not one free variable. 
However, according to the lemma in Ref.[2, §2]: “Suppose R0⊆T. If T is ω-consistency, then T is 
ω
k
-consistency, for all k”, we can only use the condition of ω-consistency in the proof of Lemma 
1(4.2). 
(5) It is obvious that the condition of “ω-consistency” in Lemma 1(4.2) can be weakened to 
that of “1-consistency
[5]
”. However, we don’t discuss “1-consistency” in this paper. 
(6) All the conclusions of Lemma 1(3), (4.1) and (4.2) hold not only for DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 
and dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}), but also for any Diophantine equation D(c, {xm})=0 and the 
corresponding representation dD(c′, {xm}) in PA.                                      ■ 
Given different formulas of PA, maybe the forms of the corresponding proof equations and 
the representations in PA are different. For instance, maybe the forms of DPE(#F, x0, {xu})=0 is 
different from that of DPE(#(┑F), x0, {xv})=0, the corresponding representations dPE((#F)′, x0, 
{xw}) and dPE((#(┑F))′, x0, {xw}) as well. On the other hand, we have the following result. 
Lemma 2. (1) There exists an universal proof equation DPE-PA(k, x0, {xn})=0 for PA such that 
once we replace k with the Gödel code #F of a formula F of PA, DPE-PA(#F, x0, {xn})=0 becomes a 
proof equation of the formula F. 
(2) The Diophantine equation DPE-PA(k, x0, {xw})=0 is undecidable. 
Remark 2. (1) The pure formal proof of Lemma 2(1) is tedious; however, the basic idea of 
the proof is actually quite simple. We explain it as follows. 
The rule of Gödelian coding insures that whether a given number a is a Gödel code of a 
proof of a given formula F of PA is decidable, we can design a computer program to do this thing. 
Such program is demanded to perform three tasks: 
Task 1: Checking whether a expresses a sequence of formulas [F1, F2, …, Fn] according to 
Gödelian coding rule. 
Task 2: Checking whether a sequence of formulas [F1, F2, …, Fn] is a proof of the last 
formula Fn in the sequence. Concretely, the program checks whether every formula Fi (1≤i≤n) 
① is an axiom, or ② follows from Fl and Fm (l＜i, m＜i ) by MP rule, or ③ follows from Fj (j
＜i) by GEN rule. 
By the way, we can improve slightly the rule of Gödelian coding of a proof of a formula by 
prescribing that, in the Gödel code of a proof of a formula F, every formula Fi (1≤i≤n) must take 
with its “warrantor”. Concretely, ① If Fi is an axiom, then it brings with the corresponding 
“axiom schema number” (We can assign a number for every axiom schema in advance); ② If Fi 
follows from Fl and Fm (l＜i, m＜i) by MP rule, then it brings with the numbers l and m; ③ If Fi 
follows from Fj (j＜i ) by GEN rule, then it brings with the number j. Designing such a coding 
system is very easy, but it brings great convenience to the design of the program. 
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Task 3: Checking whether the last formula Fn in a sequence of formulas [F1, F2, …, Fn] is 
the given formula F. 
Notice that both Task 1 and Task 2 are independent of the given formula F, hence, if the 
process of the program execution is Task 1  →
YES
Task 2  →
YES
Task 3, then this program is 
available for any formula in PA. 
We therefore obtain an universal program, or an universal algorithm, C(k, a). Once k in C(k, 
a) is replaced by the Gödel code #F of a formula F in PA, C(#F, a) becomes a program checking 
whether a number a is a Gödel code of a proof of the formula F. 
Applying the MRDP theorem to the algorithm C(k, a), we can find out a corresponding 
Diophantine equation DPE-PA(k, a, {xw})=0 with two parameters k and a such that once k is 
replaced by the Gödel code #F of a formula F in PA, DPE-PA(#F, a, {xw})=0 has solution if and 
only if a is a Gödel code of a proof of the formula F. 
And then, by replacing a in DPE-PA(k, a, {xw})=0 with an unknown x0, we obtain an universal 
proof equation DPE-PA(k, x0, {xn})=0 for any formula of PA. 
(2) It is obvious that the method obtaining an universal proof equation for PA presented in 
Remark 2(1) is constructive. Of course, how to construct a simple universal proof equation for PA 
is a different matter. 
(3) As well-known, whether a formula of PA is a theorem in PA is undecidable. Hence, for the 
set FC: = {b∈FC | b is a Gödel code of a formula of PA}, if k∈FC, then whether the equation 
DPE-PA(k, x0, {xw})=0 has solution is undecidable. (Notice that by an analysis similar to Remark 
1(2) we see that if k∈FC then whether the equation DPE-PA(k, a, {xw})=0 has solution for a given a 
is decidable.) Now that whether the equation DPE-PA(k, x0, {xw})=0 has solution is undecidable for 
k∈FC, which is a subset of the set of natural numbers, DPE-PA(k, x0, {xw})=0 is thus undecidable 
and can be as an example of undecidable Diophantine equations.                         ■ 
Once we obtain an universal proof equation DPE-PA(k, x0, {xn})=0 for PA, for which we can 
introduce the corresponding representation dPE-PA(k, x0, {xn}) in PA, and by BPA(x) we denote the 
formula ∃(x0, {xw}) dPE-PA(x, x0, {xw}).  
All the conclusions in Lemma 1 hold for DPE-PA(k, x0, {xn})=0, dPE-PA(k, x0, {xn}) and BPA(x). 
Especially, immediately from Lemma 1(2.1) and Lemma 1(4.1) we obtain 
(P1)  If PA┣ A, then PA┣ BPA((#A)′). 
And, further, we assume that BPA(x) satisfies the following two properties. 
Hypothesis. For arbitrary formulas A, A1 and A2 of PA, 
(P2)  PA┣ BPA((#(A1→ A2))′) → (BPA((#A1)′) →BPA((#A2)′)). 
(P3)  PA┣ BPA((#A)′) →BPA((#(BPA((#A)′)))′). 
As well-known, (P1) ~ (P3) are so called Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions
[6, 7, 8]
, 
we are not going to discuss the proof of (P2) and (P3) here and, thus, regard them as 
“Hypothesis”. 
Generally speaking, if PA is ω-consistent, then BPA(x) is stronger than the provability 
predicate ProofF in a system T. For example, apart from satisfying (P1) ~ (P3), for BPA(x) we have 
“If PA┣BPA((#F)′), then PA┣F” (Immediately from Lemma 1(4.2) and Lemma 1(2.1)). However, 
the provability predicate ProofF in T has not such property when T is not demanded to be 
ω-consistent
[6]
. And, in the discussion below, we also do not demand that PA is ω-consistent. 
If (P1) ~ (P3) hold for BPA(x), then we have 
Lemma 3 (Löb's Theorem). For any formula A, if PA┣ BPA((#A)′) → A, then PA┣ A. 
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Lemma 4 (Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, abstract form). If PA is consistent, 
then if A is an axiom or a theorem of PA, then not PA┣ ┑BPA((#(┑A))′). 
Remark 3. The difference between Lemma 3 and the standard form of the Löb's Theorem 
(See, for example, Refs. [6] or [8]) is only that the provability predicate ProofF in the standard 
form is replaced by BPA(x) given by this paper, the difference between Lemma 4 and the standard 
form of the abstract form of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem as well. We therefore can 
follow those proofs of the standard forms in literatures to prove Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. For 
example, we can copy verbatim the proof of Theorem 18.4 in Ref. [6] as that of Lemma 3, as long 
as in which B(x) is replaced by the formula BPA(x). Similarly, we can obtain a proof of Lemma 4 
through replacing the formula 0=1 with ┑A, where A is any axiom or theorem of PA, and 
replacing B(x) with the formula BPA(x) in the proof of Theorem 18.3, in which the Löb's Theorem 
is used, in Ref. [6].                                                             ■ 
We now investigate what result can be obtained from Lemmas 1 ~ 4. If A is an axiom or a 
theorem of PA, then according to Lemma 1(2.2), if PA is consistent, then the assertion “the 
Diophantine equation DPE-PA(#(┑A), x0, {xw})=0 has no solution” is true. On the other hand, the 
corresponding representation in PA of this assertion is just ┑BPA((#(┑A))′), and Lemma 4 shows 
that if PA is consistent, then ┑BPA((#(┑A))′) is not provable in PA. We therefore obtain the 
following conclusion: 
Theorem. For every axiom and every theorem of PA, we can construct a corresponding 
Diophantine equation such that if PA is consistent, then the Diophantine equation has no solution, 
but this fact is not provable within PA. 
The above Theorem shows that undecidable propositions are at least as much as the 
summation of whole axioms and theorems in PA, since for every axiom and every theorem of PA, 
we can construct a corresponding undecidable proposition. 
Using the proof equation of a formula of PA and the corresponding representation, we can do 
other things. For example, applying the Diagonal Theorem
[6, 7, 8]
 to two formulas ┑BPA(x) and 
BPA(x), we obtain the Gödel sentence G ↔ ┑BPA((#G)′) and the Henkin sentence H↔ BPA((#H)′) 
with Diophantine form, respectively. 
On the other hand, given a proposition f (or its negation) in elementary number theory, e.g., 
twin prime conjecture, Goldbach’s conjecture, the Riemann hypothesis
[9]
, P≠NP
[10]
, we can find 
out the corresponding formula F (or ┑F) of PA. And then, we construct the corresponding proof 
equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 or DPE-PA(#F, x0, {xn})=0 of the formula F. Once we obtain a 
solution of DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 or DPE-PA(#F, x0, {xn})=0, at the same time we obtain a proof of 
the proposition f . And, if we prove that the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 or DPE-PA(#F, x0, {xn})=0 
has solution, then we know that the proposition f holds. We can deal with the negation of f in the 
same way. 
We can generate the above method obtaining a proof of a proposition in elementary number 
theory to any mathematical (set theoretical, number theoretical, algebraic, geometrical, topological, 
etc) proposition. Namely, taking advantage of the idea of proof equation, maybe we can transform 
seeking a proof of a mathematical proposition into solving a Diophantine equation. 
For realizing such transformation, given a proposition f in a mathematical system s, we first 
construct a corresponding formal system S. The construction of S can be quite “random”. For 
example, we can add some known theorems as axioms, and try to use second-order logic, etc, 
because our purpose is now not to study a formal system. However, we make demands on S: ① 
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There is a formula F of S to express the proposition f of s. ② Gödelian coding must be 
implemented in S. 
And then, we introduce a set PrfF for the formula F of S: 
PrfF := {a∈PrfF | a is a Gödel code of a proof of the formula F of S}, 
by applying the MRDP theorem to the recursive set PrfF we find out a Diophantine equation 
DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 such that a∈PrfF if and only if DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 has solution. 
Finally, we replace a in the equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 with an unknown x0 and try to solve 
the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0. If we obtain a solution, then we obtain a proof of the original 
proposition f. 
We emphasize again the differences between two equations DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 and DPE(#F, 
x0, {xw})=0 for formula F of formal system S (see Remark 1(2)). Hence, even if we have had a 
corresponding equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 of a proposition f, we still need creative intellectual 
work of human being. 
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